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We use the information in credit-default swaps to obtain direct measures of the size of the default
and nondefault components in corporate spreads. We find that the majority of the corporate spread
is due to default risk. This result holds for all rating categories and is robust to the definition of the
riskless curve. We also find that the nondefault component is time varying and strongly related to
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UCLA1. INTRODUCTION
How do ﬁnancial markets value corporate debt? What portion of corporate yield
spreads is directly attributable to default risk? How much of the spread stems from
other factors such as liquidity and taxes? These issues are of fundamental impor-
tance from an investment perspective since corporate debt outstanding in the U.S.
now approaches $5 trillion, making it one of the largest asset classes in the ﬁnancial
markets. These issues are also of key importance from a corporate ﬁnance perspective
because the presence of nondefault components in corporate spreads could directly
aﬀect capital structure decisions as well as the timing of debt and equity issues.
A number of papers have studied the determinants of corporate yield spreads. Im-
portant examples include Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995a), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Duﬀee (1999), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and
Mann (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Delianedis and Geske
(2001), Liu, Longstaﬀ,a n dM a n d e l l( 2 0 0 2 ) ,E o m ,H e l w e ge, and Huang (2003), Huang
and Huang (2003), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003), and many others.
Previously, however, researchers have been limited by having only bond data available
to them in their eﬀorts to identify the components of corporate spreads.
In the past several years, however, credit derivatives have begun trading actively
in ﬁnancial markets. By their nature, these innovative contracts provide researchers
with a near-ideal way of directly measuring the size of the default component in
corporate spreads. Credit derivatives are rapidly becoming one of the most successful
ﬁnancial innovations of the past decade. The British Bankers’ Association estimates
that from a total notional amount of $180 billion in 1997, the credit-derivatives market
grew more than tenfold to $2.0 trillion by the end of 2002. Furthermore, the British
Bankers’ Association forecasts that the total notional amount of credit derivatives will
r e a c h$ 4 . 8t r i l l i o nb yt h ee n do f2 0 0 4 .
This paper uses the information in credit-default swap premia to provide direct
measures of the size of the default and nondefault components in corporate yield
spreads. Credit-default swaps are the most common type of credit derivative. In
a credit-default swap, the party buying protection pays the seller a ﬁxed premium
each period until either default occurs or the swap contract matures. In return, if the
underlying ﬁrm defaults on its debt, the protection seller is obligated to buy back from
the buyer the defaulted bond at its par value. Thus, a credit-default swap is similar to
an insurance contract compensating the buyer for losses arising from a default. A key
aspect of our study is the use of an extensive data set on credit-default swap premia
and corporate bond prices provided to us by the Global Credit Derivatives desk at
Citigroup. This proprietary data set includes weekly market quotations for a broad
1cross section of ﬁrms actively traded in the credit-derivatives market.
In measuring the size of the default component, we use two approaches. First,
we use the credit-default swap premium directly as a measure of the default com-
ponent in corporate spreads. As shown by Duﬃe and Liu (2001), however, this
widely-used model-independent approach can be biased. Accordingly, we also use
a reduced-form-model approach to measure the size of the default component. Specif-
ically, we develop closed-form expressions for corporate bond prices and credit-default
swap premia within the familiar Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999) framework. In
this reduced-form model, corporate cash ﬂows are discounted at an adjusted rate that
includes a liquidity or convenience-yield process. This feature allows the model to cap-
ture any liquidity or other nondefault-related components in corporate bond prices.
For each ﬁrm in the sample, we ﬁt the model jointly to credit-default swap premia
and a cross section of corporate bond prices with maturities straddling the ﬁve-year
horizon of the credit-default swaps in the sample. Once estimated, the default com-
ponent is given directly from the closed-form expression for corporate bond prices.
We illustrate these approaches with a detailed case study of Enron. The analysis is
then extended to include all ﬁrms in the sample. To insure that the results are robust
to alternative speciﬁcations of the riskless rate, we report results using the Treasury,
Refcorp, and swap curves to calculate corporate spreads.
We ﬁnd that the default component accounts for the majority of the corporate
spread across all credit ratings. In particular, calculating spreads relative to the Trea-
sury curve, the default component represents 51 percent of the spread for AAA/AA-
rated bonds, 56 percent for A-rated bonds, 71 percent for BBB-rated bonds, and 83
percent for BB-rated bonds. The percentages are even higher when the other curves
are used to calculate spreads.
These results contrast with those in Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Elton,
Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Delianedis and Geske (2001), Huang and Huang
(2003), and others who report that default risk accounts for only a small percentage of
the spread for investment-grade bonds. However, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann
ﬁnd that spreads include an important risk premium in addition to compensation for
the expected default loss. Since the credit-default swap premium measures the risk-
neutral default component (expected default loss plus credit-risk premium), our results
may in fact be consistent with theirs. Furthermore, Delianedis and Geske and Huang
and Huang show that under some parameterizations, results paralleling ours can be
obtained from a structural model. Doing so, however, requires either larger jump
sizes or credit-risk premia than in typical calibrations.1 Finally, Eom, Helwege, and
Huang (2003) show that some structural models can actually overestimate corporate
1However, recent work by Liu, Longstaﬀ, and Mandell (2002), Pan (2002), and Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) suggests that the market price of jump-
related risks such as default is surprisingly large in some markets.
2spreads. Thus, our results may prove useful in identifying which structural models
and calibrations best explain the pricing of corporate debt.
On the other hand, our results indicate that the default component does not ac-
count for the entire corporate credit spread. Using the Treasury curve to calculate
spreads, we ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant nondefault component for every ﬁrm in the
sample. This nondefault component ranges from about 20 to 100 basis points. Simi-
larly, using the Refcorp and swap curves, we ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant nondefault
component for 96 and 75 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample, respectively.
To test whether the nondefault component is related to taxes or the illiquidity
of corporate bonds, we regress the average value of the nondefault component on the
coupon rate and various measures of individual corporate bond illiquidity. We ﬁnd
only weak evidence that the nondefault component is related to the diﬀerential state
tax treatment given to Treasury and corporate bonds. In contrast, the nondefault
component is strongly related to measures of individual corporate bond illiquidity
such as the size of the bid/ask spread and the principal amount outstanding. We also
explore the time-series properties of the average nondefault component by regressing
w e e k l yc h a n g e si ni t sv a l u eo nl a g g e dc h a n g e sa n dm e a s u r e so fT r e a s u r yr i c h n e s so r
specialness and overall bond-market liquidity. The average nondefault component is
strongly mean reverting and directly relat e dt om e a s u r e so fT r e a s u r yb o n dr i c h n e s s
and marketwide measures of liquidity such as ﬂows into money market mutual funds
and the amount of new corporate debt issued. These results indicate that there are im-
portant individual corporate-bond and marketwide liquidity dimensions to corporate
spreads.
The literature on credit derivatives is growing rapidly. Important theoretical
work in the area includes Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, 2000), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995a, b), Das (1995), Das and Tufano (1996), Duﬃe (1998, 1999), Lando (1998),
Duﬃe and Singleton (1999), Hull and White (2000, 2001), Das and Sundaram (2000),
Jarrow and Yildirim (2002), Acharya, Das, and Sundaram (2002), Das, Sundaram,
and Sundaresan (2003), and many others. There are also several recent empirical
studies of the pricing of credit-default swaps including Cossin, Hricko, Aunon-Nerin,
and Huang (2002), Zhang (2003), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2003), Houweling and
Vorst (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), and Hull, Predescu, and White (2004). This
paper diﬀers from these other papers in that we use the information in credit-default
swap premia to study the components of corporate yield spreads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
introduction to credit-default swaps and the credit-derivatives market. Section 3 de-
scribes how the default component of corporate spreads is identiﬁed from credit-default
swap and corporate bond data. Section 4 presents a case study of Enron. Section
5 presents the empirical estimates of the size of the default component in corporate
spreads. Section 6 examines the properties of the nondefault component of the spread.
Section 7 summarizes the results and makes concluding remarks.
32. CREDIT-DEFAULT SWAPS
Credit derivatives are contingent claims with payoﬀs that are linked to the credit-
worthiness of a given ﬁrm or sovereign entity. The purpose of these instruments is to
allow market participants to trade the risk associated with certain debt-related events.
C r e d i td e r i v a t i v e sw i d e l yu s e di np r a c t i c ei nclude total-return swaps, spread options,
and credit-default swaps.2 In this paper, we focus exclusively on the latter since they
a r et h ep r e d o m i n a n tt y p eo fc r e d i td e r i v a t i v et r a d i n gi nt h em a r k e t . 3
The simplest example of a single-name credit-default swap contract can be il-
lustrated as follows. The ﬁrst party to the contract, the protection buyer, wishes to
insure against the possibility of default on a bond issued by a particular company. The
company that has issued the bond is called the reference entity. The bond itself is
designated the reference obligation. The second party to the contract, the protection
seller, is willing to bear the risk associated with default by the reference entity. In the
event of a default by the reference entity, the protection seller agrees to buy the refer-
ence issue at its face value from the protection buyer. In return, the protection seller
receives a periodic fee from the protection buyer. This fee, typically quoted in basis
points per $100 notional amount of the reference obligation, is called the default swap
premium. Once there has been a default and the contract has settled (exchange of the
bond and the face value) the protection buyer discontinues the periodic payment. If
a default does not occur over the life of the contract, then the contract expires at its
maturity date.
As a speciﬁc example, suppose that on January 23, 2002, a protection buyer wishes
to buy ﬁve years of protection against the default of the Worldcom 7.75 percent bond
maturing April 1, 2007. The buyer owns 10,000 of these bonds, each having a face
amount of $1,000. Thus, the notional value of the buyer’s position is $10,000,000. The
buyer contracts to buy full protection for the face amount of the debt via a single-name
credit-default swap with a 169 basis point premium. Thus, the buyer pays a premium
of A/360×169, or approximately 42.25 basis points per quarter for protection, where
A denotes the actual number of days during a quarter. This translates into a quar-
terly payment of A/360 × $10,000,000 × .0169 = A/360 × $169,000. If there is a
default, then the buyer delivers the 10,000 Worldcom bonds to the protection seller
and receives a payment of $10,000,000. If the credit event occurs between default swap
premium payments, then at ﬁnal settlement, the protection buyer must also pay to
t h ep r o t e c t i o ns e l l e rt h a tp a r to ft h eq u a r t e rly default swap premium that has accrued
2Credit-default swaps on a portfolio of bonds, sometimes called portfolio credit-default
swaps, also exist. For example, see Fitch IBCA, Duﬀ and Phelps (2001).
3The British Bankers’ Association (2002) reports that single-name credit-default swaps
are the most popular type of credit derivative, representing nearly 50 percent of the
credit-derivatives market.
4since the most recent default swap premium payment.4 Credit events that typically
trigger a credit-default swap include bankrupt c y ,f a i l u r et op a y ,d e f a u l t ,a c c e l e r a t i o n ,
a repudiation or moratorium, or a restructuring.
In the most general credit-default swap contract, the parties may agree that any
of a set of bonds or loans may be delivered in the case of a physical settlement (as
opposed to cash settlement, to be discussed below). In this case, the reference issue
serves as a benchmark against which other possible deliverable bonds or loans might
be considered eligible. In any case, the deliverable obligations are usually speciﬁed
in the contract. It is also possible, however, that a reference obligation may not be
speciﬁed. In this case, any senior unsecured obligation of the reference entity may
be delivered. Cash settlement, rather than physical settlement, may be speciﬁed in
the contract. The cash settlement amount would either be the diﬀerence between
the notional and market value of the reference issue (which could be ascertained by
polling bond dealers), or a predetermined fraction of the notional amount. Note that
because the protection buyer generally has a choice of the bond or loan to deliver in
the event of default, a credit-default swap could include a delivery option similar to
that in Treasury note and bond futures contracts.5
Since credit-default swaps are OTC contracts, the maturity is negotiable, and
maturities from a few months to ten years or more are possible, although ﬁve years
is the most common horizon. In this paper, we focus on credit-default swaps for
corporates and ﬁnancials with a ﬁve-year horizon. The notional amount of credit-
default swaps ranges from a few million to more than a billion dollars, with the average
being in the range of $25 to $50 million (J.P. Morgan (2000)). A wide range of
institutions participates in the credit-derivatives market. Banks, security houses, and
hedge funds dominate the protection-buyers market, with banks representing about 50
percent of the demand. On the protection-sellers side, banks and insurance companies
dominate (British Bankers’ Association (2002)).
3. MEASURING THE DEFAULT COMPONENT
In this section, we describe the two approaches used to measure the size of the default
component in corporate yield spreads. To be clear about deﬁnitions, corporate bond
yield spreads will always be calculated as the yield on a corporate bond minus the
yield on a riskless bond with the identical coupon rate and maturity date. Thus, we
compare the yields on risky and riskless bonds with identical promised cash ﬂows.6
4Worldcom ﬁled for bankruptcy on July 21, 2002.
5For an in-depth discussion of this feature, see Mithal (2002).
6T h i sf e a t u r ei si m p o r t a n ts i n c et h i sa l l o w su st om e a s u r et h ep u r ee ﬀect of default risk
on yields. If the coupon and maturity are not held constant the yield spread measure
5In the ﬁrst approach, we follow the widely-used industry practice of assuming that
the credit-default swap premium equals the default component for the ﬁrm’s bonds.
Comparing the credit-default swap premium for a ﬁve-year contract directly with the
corporate spread for a ﬁve-year bond provides a simple model-independent measure
of the percentage size of the default component.
Although straightforward to implement, it is important to stress that this ap-
proach generally produces a biased measure of the default component. As shown by
Duﬃe (1999), the credit-default swap premium should equal the spread between cor-
porate and riskless ﬂoating-rate notes. Duﬃe and Liu (2001), however, show that
the spread between corporate and riskless ﬁxed-coupon bonds is generally not equal
to the spread between corporate and riskless ﬂoating-rate notes. As we will show,
the diﬀerence between ﬁxed-rate and ﬂoating-rate spreads can be as much as 5 to 10
basis points or more in our sample. In general, the eﬀect of the bias is to underesti-
mate the size of the default component in investment-grade bonds, and vice versa for
below-investment-grade bonds. This bias can be avoided by using an explicit credit
model to make the adjustment from ﬂoating-rate to ﬁxed-rate spreads. Accordingly,
in our second approach, we develop a simple closed-form model for valuing credit-
sensitive contracts and securities within the well-known reduced-form framework of
Duﬃe (1998), Lando (1998), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999) and others. Once ﬁt-
ted to the data, the model can then be used to provide direct estimates of the default
component of the spread implied by credit-default swap premia.
Following Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), let rt denote the riskless rate, λt the inten-
sity of the Poisson process governing default, and γt a convenience-yield or liquidity
process that will be used to capture the extra return investors may require, above and
beyond compensation for credit risk, from holding corporate rather than riskless secu-
r i t i e s .E a c ho ft h ep r o c e s s e srt, λt and γt is stochastic, although we assume that they
evolve independently of each other. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the model, but
has little eﬀect on the empirical results. As in Lando (1998), we make the assumption
that a bondholder recovers a fraction 1 − w of the par value of the bond in the event
of default.
Given the independence assumption, we do not actually need to specify the risk-
neutral dynamics of the riskless rate to solve for credit-default swap premia and cor-
porate bond prices. We require only that these dynamics be such that the value of a











To specify the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity process λt, we assume that
c a nc o n f o u n dt h ee ﬀects of default risk with term structure eﬀects.
6dλ =( α − βλ) dt + σ
√
λ dZλ, (2)
where α, β,a n dσ are positive constants, and Zλ is a standard Brownian motion.
These dynamics allow for both mean reversion and conditional heteroskedasticity in
corporate spreads and guarantee that the intensity process is always nonnegative. For
the risk-neutral dynamics of the liquidity process γt,w ea s s u m et h a t
dγ = η dZγ, (3)
where η is a positive constant and Zγ is also a standard Brownian motion. These
dynamics allow the liquidity process to take on both positive and negative values.7
Following Duﬃe (1998), Lando (1998), Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) and others, it
is now straightforward to represent the values of corporate bonds and the premium and
protection legs of a credit-default swap as simple expectations under the risk-neutral
measure. Let c denote the coupon rate for a corporate bond, which for expositional
simplicity is assumed to pay coupons continuously. The price of this corporate bond







































The ﬁrst term in this expression is the present value of the coupons promised by the
bond, the second term is the present value of the promised principal payment, and the
third term is the present value of recovery payments in the event of a default. Observe
that in each term, corporate cash ﬂows are discounted at the adjusted discount rate
rt + λt + γt.
Turning now to the valuation of the credit-default swap, it is important to recall
that swaps are contracts, not securities. This distinction is important because the
contractual nature of credit-default swaps makes them far less sensitive to liquidity
7We also explored alternative speciﬁcations for γt that allow for a mean-reverting
drift. These speciﬁcations generally did not perform better than Eq. (3), and often
did worse because of parameter identiﬁcation problems.
7or convenience-yield eﬀects. First, securities are in ﬁxed supply. In contrast, the
notional amount of credit-default swaps can be arbitrarily large. This means that
the types of supply and demand pressures that may aﬀect corporate bonds are much
less likely to inﬂuence credit-default swaps. Second, the generic or fungible nature of
contractual cash ﬂows means that credit-default swaps cannot become “special” in the
way that securities such as Treasury bonds or popular stocks may.8 Third, since new
credit-default swaps can always be created, these contracts are much less susceptible
to being “squeezed” than the underlying corporate bonds. Fourth, since credit-default
swaps resemble insurance contracts, many investors who buy credit protection may
intend to do so for a ﬁxed horizon and, hence, may not generally plan to unwind
their position earlier. Fifth, even if an investor wants to liquidate a credit-default
swap position, it may be less costly to simply enter into a new swap in the opposite
direction than to try to sell his current position. Thus, the liquidity of his current
position is less relevant given his ability to replicate swap cash ﬂows through other
contracts. Sixth, it can sometimes be diﬃcult and costly to short corporate bonds.
In contrast, it is generally as easy to sell protection as it is to buy protection in
credit-default swap markets. Finally, Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2003) ﬁnd that
credit-derivative markets are more liquid than corporate bond markets in the sense
that new information is impounded into credit-default swap premia more rapidly than
into corporate bond prices.
Because of these considerations, we assume that the convenience-yield or illiquid-
ity process γt is applicable to the cash ﬂows from corporate bonds, but not to cash
ﬂows from credit-default swap contracts. Alternatively, γt can also be viewed as the
diﬀerential convenience yield between corporate securities and credit-derivative con-
tracts. Let s denote the premium paid by the buyer of default protection. Assuming
that the premium is paid continuously, the present value of the premium leg of a

































Setting the values of the two legs of the credit-default swap equal to each other and
8For example, see Duﬃe (1996), Duﬃe, Garleanu, Pederson (2002), and Geczy, Musto,
and Reed (2002).
























If λt is not stochastic, the premium is simply λw.E v e nw h e nλt is stochastic, however,
the premium can be interpreted as a present-value-weighted-average of λtw.I ng e n e r a l ,
because of the negative correlation between λt and exp(−
$ t
0 λs ds), the premium
should be less than the expected average value of λt times w.
Given the square-root dynamics for the intensity process λt and the Gaussian
dynamics for the liquidity process γt, standard results such as those in Duﬃe, Pan,
and Singleton (2000) make it straightforward to derive closed-form solutions for the
expectations in Eqs. (4) and (7). Appendix A shows that the value of a corporate




A(t)e x p (B(t) λ ) C(t) D(t) e−γt dt +




exp( B(t) λ ) C(t) D(t)(G(t)+H(t) λ ) e−γt dt, (8)
where λ and γ denote the current (or time-zero) values of the intensity and liquidity




















































κ =( β + φ)/(β − φ).




0 exp( B(t) λ ) D(t)(G(t)+H(t) λ ) dt
$ T
0 A(t)e x p (B(t) λ ) D(t) dt
. (9)
With these closed-form solutions, our empirical approach will be to ﬁtt h em o d e l
to match simultaneously the credit-default swap premium and the prices of a set of
corporate bonds with maturities straddling the ﬁve-year maturity of the credit-default
swap.
4. THE ENRON CASE STUDY
Before applying this approach to the entire sample, it is helpful to ﬁrst illustrate how
10these approaches are implemented via a case study of Enron during the year leading
up to its eventual default and Chapter 11 bankruptcy ﬁling on December 2, 2001.
Two primary types of Enron data are used in this case study: Credit-default swap
premia and corporate bond yields.
T h ec r e d i t - d e f a u l ts w a pd a t au s e di nt h i s case study consist of bid and ask quo-
tations for ﬁve-year credit-default swaps on Enron during the period from December
5, 2000 to October 22, 2001. Quotations are obtained on days when there is some
level of participation in the market as evidenced either through trades or by active
market making by a dealer. For Enron, we select 31 observations during the sample
period, corresponding to roughly a weekly frequency, based on the availability of data
on corporate bond yields and credit-default swap premia. As the point estimate of the
credit-default swap premium, we use the midpoint of the bid and ask quotations. The
data are provided to us by the Global Credit Derivatives desk at Citigroup. We note,
however, that the data set includes quotations from a variety of credit-derivatives
dealers. Thus, quotations should be representative of the entire credit-derivatives
market.
Since the credit-default swaps in the sample have a ﬁve-year horizon, it would
be ideal if there was always a matching ﬁve-year bond available at each observation
date from which the corporate spread or probability of default could be determined.
In reality, there are no Enron bonds that exactly match the ﬁve-year maturity of the
credit-default swaps for any of the observation dates in the sample. Even if there were,
the possibility of noise or measurement error in the bond price data would introduce
volatility into the estimate of the default probability. To address these two problems,
we adopt the following straightforward, and hopefully, more robust approach. Rather
than focusing on a speciﬁc Enron bond, we use data from a set of bonds with maturities
that bracket the ﬁve-year horizon of the credit-default swap. The process used to
identify these bonds is described in Appendix B. This process resulted in a set of eight
Enron bonds with maturities ranging from June 2003 to October 2007.9 These eight
bonds are all ﬁxed-rate senior unsecured dollar-denominated debt obligations of Enron
and do not have any embedded options. Only bonds that are registered with the SEC
are included in the set. The coupon rates for these bonds range from 6.625 to 9.875
percent. We refer to this set of bonds as the bracketing set. The bond yield data
are also obtained from a proprietary corporate bond database provided by Citigroup.
Given the well-documented measurement problems associated with corporate bond
data, we conducted a number of robustness checks using data for the bonds collected
from the Bloomberg system to verify that our data are reliable.
9The maturity dates of the credit-default swaps associated with the ﬁrst and last dates
in the sample are December 5, 2005 and October 22, 2006. Thus, this set of bonds
has maturities that bracket the maturity dates of the credit-default swap quotes in
the sample.
11Before turning to the estimation of the default component, we ﬁrst need to identify
a riskless discount function D(T) for each observation date. To insure that the results
are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the riskless rate, we use three diﬀerent curves
to generate the riskless discount function: The Treasury, Refcorp, and swap curves.
We use the Treasury curve since it is the standard benchmark riskless curve in most
empirical tests in ﬁn a n c e . T h eu s eo ft h eR e f c o r pc u r v ei sm o t i v a t e db yar e c e n t
paper by Longstaﬀ (2004) that shows that Refcorp bonds have the same default risk
as Treasury bonds but not the same liquidity or specialness of Treasury bonds. Thus,
the Refcorp curve may provide a more accurate measure of the riskless curve than
the Treasury curve. Finally, we use the swap curve since this curve is widely used
by practitioners to discount cash ﬂows in ﬁxed income derivatives markets. As shown
by Duﬃe and Singleton (1997) and Liu, Longstaﬀ, and Mandell (2002), however, the
swap curve includes both credit and default components.
For the Treasury curve, we collect data for the constant maturity six-month, one-
year, two-year, three-year, ﬁve-year, seven-year, and ten-year rates from the Federal
Reserve. We then use a standard cubic spline algorithm to interpolate these par
rates at semiannual intervals. These par rates are then bootstrapped to provide a
discount curve at semiannual intervals. To obtain the value of the discount function
at other maturities, we use a straightforward linear interpolation of the corresponding
forward rates. For the Refcorp curve, we collect three-month, six-month, one-year,
two-year, three-year, ﬁve-year, seven-year, and ten-year zero-coupon yields directly
from the Bloomberg system which uses a bootstrap algorithm very similar to that
d e s c r i b e da b o v e . W et h e nu s et h es a m ea p p r o a c ho fl i n e a r l yi n t e r p o l a t i n gf o r w a r d
rates to obtain the discount function for other maturities. Finally, we collect constant
maturity three-month, six-month, one-year, two-year, three-year, ﬁve-year, seven-year,
and ten year swap rates from the Bloomberg system and follow the same algorithm
as that described above for the Treasury curve to obtain swap discount functions. In
each case, we collect data for a ten-year horizon since all of the corporate bonds in
our sample have a maturity of ten years or less.
To compute the corporate spread, we use the following procedure. For each
corporate bond in the bracketing set, we solve for the yield on a riskless bond with
t h es a m em a t u r i t yd a t ea n dc o u p o nr a t e . S ubtracting this riskless yield from the
yield on the corporate bond gives the yield spread for that particular corporate bond.
To obtain a ﬁve-year-horizon yield spread for the ﬁrm, we regress the yield spreads
for the individual bonds in the bracketing set on their maturities. We then use the
ﬁtted value of the regression at a ﬁve-year horizon as the estimate of the corporate
spread for the ﬁrm. Fig. 1 plots the yield spread, the credit-default swap premium,
and the stock price for Enron during the sample period. Recall that in the model-
independent approach, the credit-default swap premium is used as the estimate of
the default component of the corporate spread. As shown, the credit-default swap
premium frequently diverges from the corporate yield spread.
12To estimate the parameters for the intensity and liquidity processes, we do the
following. First, we pick trial values for the parameters α, β, σ,a n dη. For each of the
31 observation dates, we have the ﬁve-year credit-default swap premium and yields for
a subset (ranging from three to eight, and averaging four) of the Enron bonds in the
bracketing set described above. Given the parameters and for each date, we solve for
the value of λt that matches exactly the value of the credit-default swap premium and
for the value of γt that results in the best root-mean-square ﬁt of the model to the bond
yields for that date.10 We repeat this process for all 31 observation dates and compute
the root-mean-squared error over all of the 31 observation dates. We then pick another
trial value of the parameters, and repeat the entire process. Convergence occurs by
searching over parameter values until the global minimum value of the overall root-
mean-squared error is obtained.11 Throughout this procedure, we hold the recovery
percentage w constant at 50 percent.12 However, the estimation results are virtually
identical when other values of w are used.
This estimation approach has several key advantages. Foremost among these is
that by ﬁtting to a cross section of bonds with maturities that bracket that of the
credit-default swap, we minimize the eﬀect of any measurement error in individual
bond prices on the results. In essence, by using a cross section of bonds, we at-
tempt to “average out” the eﬀects of idiosyncratic pricing errors in individual bonds.
Nonetheless, λt by design captures the default risk of the ﬁr mb e c a u s ei t sv a l u ei sc h o -
sen to ﬁt the credit-default swap premium exactly, while γt is chosen to ﬁtt h eb o n d
prices as well as possible. Thus, γt captures the nondefault yield spread associated
with bonds in the bracketing set.
This process results in estimates of the four parameters α, β, σ,a n dη of the risk-
neutral dynamics as well as for the values of λt and γt for each of the 31 observation
dates in the sample. The overall root-mean-squared error from the ﬁtting procedure
ranges from about 10 to 17 basis points, depending on which discounting curve is used.
These ﬁtting errors are relatively small given the large variation in Enron spreads
during the sample period.13
10In doing this, we ﬁt the market bond and credit-default swap data to discrete versions
of Eqs. (8) and (9) that match the actual semiannual timing of coupon payments and
the quarterly timing of swap premia (rather than assuming that cash ﬂows are paid
continuously).
11As a further identiﬁcation condition, we require that the estimated values of σ and
η be consistent with the volatilities of changes in the estimated λt and γt values.
12A 50 percent recovery rate is consistent with the median value for senior unsecured
b o n d sr e p o r t e di nD u ﬃe and Singleton (1999).
13We also estimate the parameters using a speciﬁcation in which we ﬁt to the prices
of the bonds, rather than the yields of the bonds. The results are nearly identical to
those reported.
13The top panel of Fig. 2 plots the implied values of the intensity process λt for
each of the 31 observation dates. As shown, the implied default intensities are almost
t h es a m ef o re a c ho ft h et h r e ed i s c o u n t i n gc u r v e s . T h ei m p l i e dd e f a u l ti n t e n s i t y
rises slowly from a level of about 150 basis points at the end of 2000 to about 250
basis points near the end of August 2001. Around the second week of October 2001,
however, the implied default intensity increases rapidly to more than 800 basis points.
Table 1 provides a chronology of some of the events leading up to Enron’s bankruptcy.
The chronology shows that the ﬁrst indications of major ﬁnancial problems at Enron
surfaced in the press around October 16, 2001. Enron’s debt was downgraded by
Standard and Poor’s to B− on November 28, 2001, and to CC on November 30, 2001.
Enron ﬁled for bankruptcy and defaulted on its debt on December 2, 2001. Note that
the last observation in our sample is dated October 22, 2001.
The middle panel of Fig. 2 plots the implied values of the liquidity process γt.
The average value of the liquidity process is 8.1 basis points when the Treasury curve
is used, −27.0 basis points when the Refcorp curve is used, and −66.4 basis points
when the swap curve is used. The liquidity process is fairly constant throughout most
of the sample period, but declines rapidly as the implied probability of a default begins
to increase in August 2001 (but not one-to-one with the increase in λ).
To solve for the default component for a corporate bond, we substitute the es-
timated parameters α, β,a n dσ and the value of λ into Eq. (8). Rather than sub-
stituting in the implied values of η and γ, however, we set their values equal to zero
in Eq. (8), or equivalently, set the value of γ equal to zero and the value of C(T)
equal to one. This gives the value of the corporate bond under the assumption that
γ is currently zero and remains at zero since η =0i m p l i e sdγ = 0. This value for the
corporate bond can be viewed as its liquidity-adjusted price, or alternatively, the price
at which the bonds would trade if there was no liquidity or convenience-yield process
(γt =0f o ra l lt). The default component is now obtained by taking the yield implied
by the liquidity-adjusted corporate bond price and subtracting the yield on a riskless
bond with identical promised cash ﬂows. To solve for the default component in the
ﬁve-year-horizon yield for a ﬁrm, we follow the same regression approach described
earlier for yield spreads in that we regress the default components for the bonds in the
bracketing set on the maturities of the bonds and use the ﬁve-year ﬁtted value as the
default component for the ﬁrm. To simplify the exposition, we will refer to the default
component for an individual bond and the ﬁve-year-horizon default component for a
ﬁrm simply as the default component whenever the context is clear. We adopt the
same convention in discussing yield spreads for individual bonds or ﬁrms.
The bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows that there is a sizable diﬀerence between
the default component for Enron and the credit-default swap premium. On average,
the default component is about 6 basis points higher than the credit-default swap
premium. Given that the nondefault component of the spread is only 8.1 basis points
on average, the bias arising from using the credit-default swap premium as the measure
14of the default component is relatively large. There is also a signiﬁcant amount of time
variation in the bias. In particular, the credit-default swap premium is a downward
biased estimate of the default component during the early part of the sample when
spreads are tighter, but becomes an upward biased estimate as Enron approaches
bankruptcy. These results conﬁrm that it is important to use a model-based approach
in estimating the components of the corporate spread.
The top panel of Fig. 3 plots the default component as a percentage of the total
spread when the Treasury curve is used. On average, default accounts for 90 percent
o ft h es p r e a d .H o w e v e r ,t h e r ei ss i g n i ﬁcant time variation in this default proportion.
The default proportion is around 75 percent at the beginning of the sample period, but
then rises to nearly 100 percent for much of the ﬁrst half of the period. The default
proportion then declines to about 70 to 80 percent in the summer, and ﬁnally rises to
more than 90 percent as Enron begins to approach ﬁnancial distress. The middle and
bottom panels of Fig. 3 plot the percentages using the Refcorp and swap curves.
5. THE DEFAULT COMPONENT
Having illustrated our approach with Enron, we now extend the analysis to a large
sample of ﬁrms using an extensive data set provided by Citigroup. This data set
includes credit-default swap premia for ﬁve-year contracts and corresponding corporate
bond prices for 68 ﬁrms actively traded in the credit-derivatives market during the
March 2001 to October 2002 period.14 Details of how the data set is constructed are
d e s c r i b e di nA p p e n d i xB .
To estimate the size of the default component for each ﬁrm, we follow the same
process as for Enron in collecting data for bonds with maturities bracketing the ﬁve-
year horizon of the credit-default swaps as well as meeting the other criteria described
in Appendix B. The set of bonds included in the sample for each ﬁrm is again referred
to as the bracketing set. The number of bonds in the bracketing set varies by ﬁrm.
The minimum number of bonds used is two and the maximum number of bonds is 18.
Since not all bonds have price data for everyd a t ef o rw h i c hw eh a v ec r e d i t - d e f a u l t
swap data, the average number of bonds used to estimate the default component on
a particular date can be less than the total number of bonds in the bracketing set.
As a preliminary analysis, Table 2 reports the ratio of the default component
for the ﬁrms in the sample to the total yield spread when the model-independent
approximation is used. Speciﬁcally, we report the ratio of the credit-default swap
premium to the total spread for each ﬁrm. The results are reported separately for
each of the three curves used as the riskless discounting curve. In each panel, we also
report the average credit-default swap premium and average total corporate spread
14The data for Enron are from December 2000 to October 2001.
15along with the ratio. The asterisk next to a ratio indicates that the ratio is statistically
diﬀerent from 1.00.
As shown, the ratio of the credit-default swap premium to the total corporate
spread varies widely across ﬁrms. As discussed earlier, the size of the default compo-
nent for investment-grade bonds tends to be higher than reported in previous studies.
On the other hand, the size of the default component for the BB-rated bonds is much
closer to that reported in earlier papers such as Huang and Huang (2003). To be spe-
ciﬁc, when the Treasury curve is used as the riskless curve, the percentage of the total
spread explained by the model-independent estimate of the default component is 49
percent for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 53 percent for A-rated bonds, 68 percent for BBB-
rated bonds, and 84 percent for below-investment-grade bonds. The corresponding
ratios are all higher when the Refcorp or swap curves are used as the riskless curve.15
We next repeat the process described in the previous section to estimate the risk-
neutral parameters and values of λt and γt for each of the ﬁrms in the sample. Table
3 reports the average values of the two processes for each ﬁrm, along with the fraction
that the average value of λt represents of the average value of λt+γt.T h i sf r a c t i o nc a n
be viewed as a measure of the instantaneous default component, or the proportion of
the spread on short-term bonds due entirely to default risk. Again, the asterisk next
to a fraction denotes that the fraction is statistically diﬀerent from 1.00.
Table 3 shows that the instantaneous default component tends to be a larger
percentage of the total spread than is the case in Table 2. When the Treasury curve
is used as the riskless curve, the proportion of the instantaneous spread explained
by default is 62 percent for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 63 percent for A-rated bonds, 79
percent for BBB-rated bonds, and 89 percent for the BB-rated bonds. Again, the
percentages are higher when the Refcorp and swap curves are used as the riskless
curve.
Table 4 reports the model-based estimates of the size of the default component
in the yield spread for the ﬁrms in the sample. As shown, the proportion of the
spread explained by default risk averages more than 50 percent across all credit-rating
categories and choices of the riskless curve. When the Treasury curve is used as the
riskless curve, the average size of the default component ranges from 51 percent for
AAA/AA-rated bonds to 83 percent for BB-rated bonds. When the Refcorp curve is
used, the corresponding percentages range from 62 percent to 86 percent. Interestingly,
when the swap curve is used as the riskless curve, the proportion due to default is
116 percent for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 89 percent for A-rated bonds, 94 percent for
BBB-rated bonds, and 95 percent for BB-rated bonds. Intuitively, the reason why
the swap curve implies default components greater that 100 percent of the corporate
spread in some cases is that the swap curve probably includes a credit component
15The rating reported for each ﬁrm is the rating on the last date of the sample period
for that ﬁrm.
16itself. Thus, ﬁrms with higher credit ratings than those in the basket of 16 banks used
in the oﬃcial Libor ﬁxing tend to have negative values for the liquidity process γt,
which, in turn, implies a negative nondefault component.
Although not shown, we also examine the percentage of the variation in corporate
spreads explained by the default component. This is done by regressing the time series
of the yield spread for each ﬁrm on the estimated default component for that ﬁrm. The
R2s from these regressions, using the Treasury curve, average 0.37 for the AAA/AA-
rated bonds, 0.43 for the A-rated ﬁrms, 0.57 for the BBB-rated ﬁrms, and 0.62 for
the BB-rated ﬁrms. The results using the Refcorp and swap curves are very similar
or slightly higher. Overall, the average R2 across all ﬁrms is about 0.51. Thus, the
default component represents the majority of the corporate spread not only in size,
but also generally in terms of the percentage of time-series variation explained.
Comparing the size of the default component in Table 4 with that from the model-
independent estimate reported in Table 2 again shows that the model-independent
approach is biased. When the Treasury curve is used as the riskless curve, the diﬀer-
ence between the estimated default components in Table 4 and Table 2 is 2.8 basis
points for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 3.6 basis points for A-rated bonds, 6.6 basis points
for BBB-rated bonds, and −1.7 basis points for BB-rated bonds.16 Failing to correctly
account for this bias could potentially have unfortunate eﬀects in drawing inferences
about the size and statistical properties of the default and nondefault components of
corporate spreads.
Although Table 4 shows that the majority of the corporate yield spread is due to
default risk, Table 4 also shows that default risk does not explain all of the corporate
spread. When the Treasury curve isu s e da st h er i s k l e s sc u r v e ,w eﬁnd that the
default component is reliably smaller than the total spread for each of the 68 ﬁrms in
the sample. When the Refcorp and swap curves are used as the riskless curve, 96 and
75 percent of the ratios are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.00, respectively. Thus, our
results about the existence of a signiﬁcant nondefault component are robust to the
choice of the riskless discounting curve.
O n ei m p o r t a n ti s s u et oc o n s i d e ri sw h e t h er our results underestimate the size of
the default component because of the eﬀects of counterparty-credit risk. If there is a
risk that the party selling credit protection might enter into ﬁnancial distress itself and
be unable to meet its contractual obligations, then the value of the promised protection
is obviously not worth as much to the buyer. In this situation, the premium that the
buyer would be willing to pay would be correspondingly less. To keep things as simple
as possible in exploring this issue, assume that with probability p the protection seller
is unable to meet his contractual obligations. Furthermore, assume that the default by
16S e v e no ft h eﬁrms in the sample have absolute biases in excess of ten basis points,
and the model-independent approach underestimates the size of the default component
for all but one of the investment-grade ﬁrms.
17the protection seller is independent of default on the underlying reference obligation.
In this simple case, the value of the protection leg is now only worth (1 − p)t i m e s
the value given in Eq. (6). In turn, this means that the protection buyer would only
b ew i l l i n gt op a y( 1− p)s,w h e r es i st h ev a l u eg i v e ni nE q . ( 7 ) . G i v e nt h i s ,i ti s
now easy to answer the question: How large would the probability of counterparty
default need to be to conclude that the corporate spread is entirely due to default
risk? The answer is 1.00 minus the default component ratio shown in Table 4. For
example, using the Treasury curve, the average ratio for AAA/AA-rated bonds is
0.51. Thus, the probability of a counterparty default would need to be 0.49, or 49
percent, for the yield spread of these bonds to be due entirely to default risk. This
is orders of magnitude larger than any realistic estimate of the default risk of the
large investement-grade ﬁrms selling credit protection even over a ﬁve-year horizon.
Similar conclusions follow for the other ratings categories in the sample. Finally, the
fact that the size of the nondefault component varies across ratings categories also
argues against the nondefault component being due to counterparty credit risk. If
the nondefault component was due to counterparty credit risk, there would be more
uniformity in its size. This follows since the set of counterparties selling protection is
likely to be very similar across all of the ﬁrms in the sample. In summary, counterparty
credit risk is unlikely to account for much of the nondefault component of spreads.
Another issue to consider is whether the larger estimates of the default component
we ﬁnd are due to illiquidity in the credit-derivatives market. The answer to this is
clearly no since the most likely eﬀect of illiquidity, if any, in the credit-derivatives
market would actually be to understate the size of the default component. To see
this, consider a market in which corporate bonds trade at a discount to their fair
value because of their illiquidity. In this market, the protection leg of a credit-default
swap would likely be worth less than its theoretical value because, similar to the cash
ﬂows from a bond, it is a credit-sensitive cash ﬂow. In contrast, the premium leg
of the credit-default swap is a completely generic ﬁxed annuity similar to that for
any interest rate swap. Thus, since both legs of a credit-default swap have to have
the same value at the inception of the swap (the zero net-present-value condition for
swaps), the premium that a protection buyer would be willing to pay would need to
be less since the value of the illiquidity-impaired protection leg is less. This means
that if there is any illiquidity component in credit-default swap premia, then we may
be underestimating the size of the default component. Thus, ﬁnding that the majority
of corporate spreads is due to default risk is likely not an artifact of the eﬀects, if any,
of illiquidity on credit-default swap premia.17
17As another robustness check, we reestimated the default component using the as-
sumption that w = 1 rather than w = .50. The results are virtually the same as
those reported here. Intuitively, the reason why the results are not sensitive to the
assumption about recovery is that w is used symmetrically in the bond price and
credit-default swap premium; the eﬀects of w largely wash out in the calibration pro-
186. THE NONDEFAULT COMPONENT
In this section, we examine the properties of the nondefault component of the spread,
which is given by simply subtracting the default component of the spread from the total
spread. The average nondefault component for each ﬁrm can be obtained directly from
Table 4 by subtracting the default component in each panel from the corresponding
corporate spread.
Fig. 4 plots histograms of the average nondefault component for each ﬁrm in the
sample. As shown, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the nondefault
components. Using the Treasury curve, the nondefault components range from 18.8
to 104.5 basis points, with a mean of 65.0. Using the Refcorp curve, the nondefault
components range from −8.1 to 89.8 basis points with a mean of 47.7. Similarly, using
the swap curve, the nondefault components range from −5 7 . 8t o5 0 . 5b a s i sp o i n t sw i t h
am e a no f8 . 6 .
Fig. 5 plots the average default and nondefault components by rating category.
As shown, both the average default and nondefault components increase as the rating
category declines. However, the plots show that the rating-related variation in the
default component is much stronger than for the nondefault component. For example,
when the Treasury curve is used, the default component ranges from 53.3 basis points
to 356.0 basis points, while the nondefault component ranges from 50.3 to 71.8 basis
points. Thus, compared to the default component, the nondefault component is nearly
constant across rating categories.
Many previous studies have found evidence of nondefault components in corporate
spreads. Important examples include Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Duﬃea n d
Singleton (1997), Duﬀee (1999), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Delianedis
and Geske (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Liu, Longstaﬀ,a n d
Mandell (2002), Huang and Huang (2003), and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2003).
Typically, these studies ﬁnd evidence that the nondefault component is related to tax
or liquidity factors. Motivated by this, we explore the determinants of the nondefault
component from both a cross-sectional and time-series perspective using a number of
tax and liquidity-related explanatory variables.
6.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis.
We focus ﬁrst on the cross-sectional variation in the time-series averages of the nonde-
fault component. Our approach in doing this is to regress the nondefault component
for individual bonds on a number of explanatory variables suggested by theoretical
considerations.
cedure. Another way of seeing this is to note that a portfolio consisting of a corporate
bond and credit protection is very nearly the same as a riskless bond irrespective of
the assumptions made about recovery.
19One important feature that could drive a wedge between the yields on corporate
and Treasury bonds is that interest on Treasury bonds is exempt from state and local
income taxes, while interest on corporate bonds is not. Note, however, that this
asymmetry does not apply to the spread between corporate and Refcorp bonds, or
corporate bonds and swaps. In a recent paper, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann
(2001) argue that the asymmetry in taxation between corporates and Treasuries might
explain a signiﬁcant portion of the yield spread between corporates and Treasuries.
Since credit-default swaps are purely contractual in nature, the premium should reﬂect
only the actual risk of default on the underlying bonds. Thus, if the spread between
corporates and Treasuries includes a tax-related component in addition to the default-
related component, then this portion of the spread should not be incorporated into
the credit-default swap premium. Of course, the size of any tax-related component
in corporate spreads will depend on the marginal state and local tax rate of the
marginal investor in the corporate bond market. The recent trend toward greater
participation in the corporate bond markets by pension, retirement, 401k, and other
tax-exempt investors, however, raises the possibility that the marginal state and local
tax rate could be very small or even zero.18 Note that any tax-related component in
y i e l ds p r e a d sw o u l db el i n k e dt ob o n d - s p e c i ﬁcf e a t u r e ss u c ha st h ec o u p o nr a t eo ft h e
corporate bond.19
To test for tax eﬀects, we use the coupon rate of the bonds as an explanatory
variable. The intuition for using this variable is that an investor with a marginal tax
rate of τ would need to receive a pre-tax coupon of c/(1 − τ)t oh a v ea na f t e r - t a x
coupon of c. Thus, the markup in the coupon to compensate for the additional state
and local taxes incurred by corporate bonds should be roughly proportional to the
coupon rate of the bonds. By including the coupon rate in the regression, we allow
for the possibility that the spread includes a tax-related component.
Another possible determinant of the nondefault component is the illiquidity of
individual corporate bonds relative to the benchmark riskless curve. For example, if
corporate bonds are less liquid than Treasury or Refcorp bonds and priced accordingly,
then corporate spreads could also include a liquidity component. Thus, the liquidity
18Sarig and Warga (1989) and Delianedis and G e s k e( 2 0 0 1 )r e p o r tt h a tm a r k e tp a r t i c -
ipants view tax-exempt pension funds as the dominant players in the corporate bond
markets.
19The eﬀects of taxation on the credit-default swap premium itself have not been
studied in the literature. We conjecture, however, that any eﬀect would be small. The
reason for this is that the market is currently limited to large institutions rather than
individuals, and that for most of these institutions, cash ﬂows and mark-to-market
gains and losses from swaps are taxed as ordinary income. Furthermore, the tax
treatment of both legs of a credit-default swap is the same; there is no tax asymmetry
driving a wedge between the values of the premium and protection legs of the swap.
20of the corporate bonds (or lack thereof relative to the bonds deﬁning the riskless curve
used to estimate the D(T) function) should not aﬀect the cost of credit protection in
the credit-default swap market.20
To test whether cross-sectional diﬀerences in the nondefault component reﬂect the
relative illiquidity of individual bonds, we regress the nondefault component for each
bond in the sample on a number of liquidity proxies for these bonds. In doing this, it is
important to acknowledge that liquidity is a concept that is sometimes diﬃcult even to
deﬁne, much less to quantify. Accordingly, our approach focuses on proxies that reﬂect
diﬀerent interpretations of liquidity and are based on available data. Unfortunately,
measures of trading activity or volume are not available to us. Also, we do not have
measures of the “specialness” or costs of shorting individual corporate bonds. As
s h o w ni nD u ﬃe (1996), these costs often mirror the relative liquidity of securities.21
The ﬁrst proxy is the average bid-ask spread (in basis points) of the corporate
bonds in the bracketing set. The bid-ask spr e a df o re a c hb o n di sc a l c u l a t e db yt a k i n g
the time-series average of the daily bid-ask spread reported by Bloomberg. These
average bid-ask spreads range from about 4 basis points to more than 15 basis points.22
The second proxy attempts to measure the general availability of the bond issue
in the market. In particular, we use the notional amount outstanding of each bond as
a proxy for the bond’s liquidity.
The third proxy is the age of the bond. This proxy parallels the notion of on-
the-run and oﬀ-the-run bonds in Treasury markets. There is extensive evidence that
on-the-run Treasury bonds are much more liquid than oﬀ-the-run Treasury bonds. If
there is a similar eﬀect in the corporate bond market, then older bonds may be less
liquid than more-recently issued bonds.
The fourth proxy is the time to maturity of the bond. The intuition for this
variable is that there may be maturity clienteles for corporate bonds. Thus, it is
possible, for example, that shorter-maturity corporate bonds may be more liquid than
20Empirical studies documenting the presence of liquidity-related premia in Treasury
bond prices include Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Kamara (1994), and Longstaﬀ
(2004).
21To provide some perspective, we contacted several securities dealers about the costs
of shorting corporate bonds. For liquid corporate bonds, the cost of shorting is only on
the order of ﬁve basis points. We note, however, that in rare cases (typically related
to ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress) corporate bonds can trade special by as much as 50 to
75 basis points for brief periods of time.
22Bid-ask spreads are calculated for bonds with Bloomberg “generic” prices, signifying
a consensus among market participants regarding the value of the bond. So called “fair
value” prices, where a bond is priced by Bloomberg using matrix-pricing techniques,
are not used in the calculation of the overall bid-ask spread.
21longer-maturity bonds. If so, then the diﬀerence in maturities across bonds may be
related to cross-sectional diﬀerences in the nondefault component.
The ﬁfth proxy is a dummy variable for bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Since
ﬁnancial ﬁrms are presumably more connected to the capital markets, their securities
may enjoy greater liquidity than the securities of other ﬁrms.23
The sixth and ﬁnal proxy for bond-speciﬁc illiquidity is a dummy variable for
bonds issued by highly-rated ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with a credit rating of AAA or AA.
The intuition for this proxy is that there may be a “ﬂight-to-quality” premium in
highly-rated bonds because they may be more marketable during a market panic or
crisis. If so, then their liquidity may be more comparable to that of Treasury bonds.
In turn, this implies that there might be a smaller nondefault component in the spread
of AAA/AA-rated bonds.
Table 5 reports the results from the regression of the nondefault component for
each bond in the sample on the tax and liquidity variables. As shown, the coupon
rate of the bond is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level for the Treasury and swap
curves, and signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level for the Refcorp curve. The regression
coeﬃcient for the Treasury regression is 5.441 which is easily in the range of realistic
marginal state income rates.24 While it may be tempting to interpret this as evidence
consistent with the tax hypothesis, the results for the other curves are not so easy to
interpret. In particular, the tax diﬀerence described above applies only to corporate
bonds vs. Treasuries. In contrast, the state tax treatment of Refcorp bonds and swaps
is essentially the same as that of corporate bonds. Thus, it is diﬃcult to interpret
the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the coupon rate in the Re f c o r pa n ds w a pr e g r e s s i o n sa s
a tax eﬀect. In fact, these signiﬁcant coeﬃcients may simply be capturing the fact
that higher-coupon bonds may be less popular or less liquid than other bonds.25 If so,
only the diﬀerence between the regression coeﬃcient in the Treasury regression and
the regression coeﬃcients in the other regression may be unambiguously interpreted
as a tax eﬀect. Subtracting 3.178 or 3.637 from 5.441 implies that the actual marginal
state tax rate incorporated into these bonds may only be on the order of one to two
percent.
Turning to the measures of corporate-bond illiquidity, Table 5 also shows that the
average bid-ask spread of the corporate bonds is signiﬁcantly positively related to the
nondefault component in all three regressions. Thus, as the liquidity of the corporate
bonds decreases, the size of the nondefault component increases. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that less-liquid bonds tend to have a larger liquidity component
23Ford Motor Credit and GMAC are treated as ﬁnancial ﬁrms in this analysis.
24The top marginal state income tax rate ranges from zero for a number of states to
9.3 percent for California and 10.4 percent for New York.
25We are grateful to the referee for pointing out this possibility.
22embedded within their yield spreads, and that this component is not included in
market credit-default swap premia. The principal amount of the bond outstanding is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to the nondefault component in each regression. These
results are also consistent with a liquidity interpretation. In particular, the nondefault
component is smaller for bonds with larger i s s u es i z e s ,w h i c ha r ep r e s u m a b l ym o r e
liquid or easy to ﬁnd in the ﬁnancial markets.
The coeﬃcient for the age of the bond is not signiﬁcant in any of the three
regressions reported in Table 5. This may be possible evidence against the existence
of an on-the-run eﬀect in the corporate bond market. It is important to raise the
caveat, however, that the age of the bonds in the sample ranges from about 1 year to
more than 10 years; newly-issued or on-the-run issues are rare in the sample. Thus,
the bonds in the sample may simply all be oﬀ-the-run bonds. In this case, it may
be unsurprising that we ﬁnd no cross-sectional eﬀects. In contrast, there is a strong
positive relation between the nondefault component and the time to maturity of the
bond. Thus, these results are consistent with the interpretation that longer-maturity
bonds are less liquid than shorter-maturity bonds.
Both of the dummy variables are signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient for the
ﬁnancial dummy variable is positive in sign. This suggests that there is an additional
11 to 13 basis points in the nondefault component of ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This is not
consistent with the hypothesis that debt issued by ﬁnancial ﬁr m si sm o r el i q u i do r
more readily marketable than debt for other ﬁrms. On the other hand, these results
do indicate that there are industry eﬀects in the nondefault component of corporate
spreads. The regression coeﬃcient for the AAA/AA dummy variable is signiﬁcant and
negative, and is about −12 or −13 basis points. This is supportive of the presence of a
small but signiﬁcant “ﬂight-to-quality” or “ﬂight-to-liquidity” premium in the prices
of the highest-rated corporate bonds.
6.2 Time-Series Analysis.
Turning now to the time-series properties of the nondefault component, we observe
that there are two ways in which a liquidity component in corporate spreads could
arise. The ﬁrst is through the idiosyncratic illiquidity of individual corporate bonds.
The eﬀect of this would be to create cross-sectional variation in the nondefault compo-
nent across bonds. The regression results in Table 5 are consistent with the presence
of bond-speciﬁc illiquidity components in corporate spreads. The second way is if
Treasury (or Refcorp or other benchmark) bonds trade at a premium because of their
unique role in ﬁnancial markets as highly-liquid or marketable havens during turbu-
lent periods (for example, during ﬂights to quality or liquidity). In this case, corpo-
rate spreads will contain a common Treasury liquidity component. The eﬀect of this
Treasury-speciﬁc richness or liquidity would be to increase the measured spread for
all corporate bonds. Thus, this eﬀect would show up only in the common time-series
variation in the nondefault components, not in the cross section of the nondefault
components.
23To test whether there is variation in the nondefault component arising from
changes or systematic shocks to marketwide liquidity measures, we average the non-
default component over ﬁrms and regress weekly changes in this measure on changes
in several macroeconomic measures of Treasury and corporate bond market liquidity.
Fig. 6 plots the time series of the average nondefault component. The ﬁrst measure
i sm o t i v a t e db yr e c e n tw o r kb yL o n g s t a ﬀ (2004), who ﬁnds that liquidity spreads in
the Refcorp market are related to ﬂows into money market mutual funds. Accord-
ingly, we obtain weekly changes in total money market mutual fund assets from the
Federal Reserve Board and include the sum of the two previous weekly changes as
an explanatory variable. The intuition for this variable is that money market mutual
funds represent a hedge against ﬂights to quality or liquidity. A sudden increase in
the amount of funds ﬂowing into money market mutual funds may be associated with
a general lack of liquidity in more-risky markets such as the corporate bond market.
This systematic liquidity shock would appear as a general widening in the spreads
between all corporate bonds and Treasury or other benchmark bonds.
The second measure is the weekly dollar amount of corporate (including agency)
debt issued in the ﬁxed income markets. This measure is obtained from the Bloomberg
system. If there is a large inﬂow of new debt in the market, the liquidity of older cor-
porate bonds may be impaired. This would translate into a widening in the nondefault
component for the bonds in our sample. Again, this variable measures marketwide
liquidity rather than bond-speciﬁc illiquidity.
The third measure is the diﬀerence in the yield of the current on-the-run ﬁve-year
Treasury bond and the average yield of generic oﬀ-the-run Treasury bonds. As the
on-the-run yield, we use the constant maturity ﬁve-year Treasury rate calculated by
the Federal Reserve from benchmark on-the-run issues. The oﬀ-the-run yield is the
ﬁve-year generic Treasury rate reported in the Bloomberg system and which is based
on the yields of nonbenchmark Treasury bonds. The spread between on-the-run and
oﬀ-the-run bonds reﬂects the specialness or liquidity of Treasury bonds (see Duﬃe
(1996)). This spread is also related to the ﬁnancing advantage of on-the-run Treasury
bonds in the special repo market (see Jordan and Jordan (1997), Buraschi and Menini
(2002), and Krishnamurthy (2002)).
Table 6 reports the result from regressing the weekly changes in the average
nondefault component on the three proxies as well as the lagged change in the non-
default component. As shown, the coeﬃcient for the lagged change in the nondefault
component is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This demonstrates that the nondefault
component is both time varying and mean reverting. Furthermore, the magnitude of
the regression coeﬃcients suggests that the speed of mean reversion is very rapid; that
shocks to the nondefault component tend to dissipate within a few weeks or months.
The coeﬃcient for the change in money market mutual fund assets is positive and
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level for the Treasury and swap regressions, and positive
and signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level for the Refcorp regression. Thus, as money ﬂows
24into defensive money market positions, the nondefault component of corporate spreads
increases. This is consistent with the interpretation of the nondefault component as
a liquidity-related component.
The amount of debt issued has a positive sign but is not signiﬁcant at conventional
levels in the Treasury and Refcorp regressions. For the swap regression, however, the
amount of debt is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the nondefault component.
This supports the view that as the market absorbs new debt, existing issues become
less liquid.
The coeﬃcient for the on-the-run/oﬀ-the-run spread is positive and signiﬁcant
at the ﬁve-percent and ten-percent levels respectively for the Refcorp and swap re-
gressions. This provides direct evidence that as the richness or extreme liquidity of
Treasury bonds increases, the average nondefault component of all corporate bonds
increases. This again supports the hypothesis that an important portion of the non-
default component of corporate spreads is due to the liquidity of the Treasury bonds.
6.3 Discussion.
Taken together, the cross-sectional and time-series results indicate that the nondefault
component of corporate bond spreads is strongly related to a number of liquidity mea-
sures. Bond-speciﬁc illiquidity measures are important in explaining cross-sectional
diﬀerences, while marketwide or macroeconomic measures of liquidity explain a siz-
able portion of the common variation in all corporate spreads. This evidence of strong
marketwide components in corporate spreads is clearly consistent with the evidence in
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) about the commonalities in corporate
spreads. In fact, they argue that the presence of an aggregate liquidity factor in bond
markets may explain most of the movements of credit spreads. Similarly, Duﬃea n d
Singleton (1997), Delianedis and Geske (2001), Liu, Longstaﬀ, and Mandell (2002),
and Longstaﬀ (2004) ﬁnd consistent evidence that time variation in corporate spreads
is related to systematic liquidity shocks. Finally, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Wang
(2003), Acharya and Pederson (2003) and others ﬁnd evidence that variation in liq-
uidity is a risk that is priced in equity markets.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we use the information in credit-default swaps to provide direct evidence
about the size of the default and nondefault components in corporate spreads. An
important feature of our analysis is the use of an extensive dataset on credit-default
swap premia and the corresponding corporate bond prices provided to us by the Global
Credit Derivatives desk at Citigroup.
The results indicate that the default component represents the majority of corpo-
rate spreads. Even for the highest-rated investment-grade ﬁrms in the sample, default
risk accounts for more than 50 percent of the total corporate spread. These results
25complement and extend previous work by suggesting that the market price of credit
risk may be larger than implied by some structural models. Alternatively, market-
implied risk-neutral estimates of jump risk may be larger than estimates based on
historical data.
We also ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant nondefault component in corporate spreads.
This result is robust to the choice of the riskless curve. We ﬁnd that the nondefault
component is time varying and mean reverts rapidly. The nondefault component of
spreads is strongly related to measures of bond-speciﬁc illiquidity such as the bid/ask
spread and the outstanding principal amount. In addition, changes in the nondefault
component are related to measures of Treasury richness such as the on-the-run/oﬀ-
the-run spread as well as to measures of the overall liquidity of ﬁxed income markets
such as the ﬂows into money market mutual funds. In contrast, there is only weak
support for the hypothesis that the nondefault component is due to taxes.
These results have many implications both for asset pricing as well as corporate
ﬁnance. For example, these results add to the rapidly-growing literature on the eﬀects
of liquidity on security prices. Furthermore, the evidence that liquidity eﬀects add
to the equilibrium cost of corporate debt is important since it may help explain why
ﬁrms tend to use less debt in their capital structure than models based on the tradeoﬀ
between the costs of ﬁnancial distress and the tax beneﬁts of debt would suggest (see
Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)). Also,
the evidence of systematic time variation in the liquidity component of corporate
spreads may shed light on the tendency of corporate debt and equity oﬀerings to
cluster.
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Let F(λ,T)d e n o t et h eﬁrst expectation on the right-hand side of (A1). As in Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), F(λ,T)s a t i s ﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation,
σ2
2
λFλλ +( α − βλ)Fλ − λF − FT =0 , (A2)
subject to the boundary condition F(λ,0) = 1. Represent F(λ,T)a sA(T)exp(B(T)λ).
Diﬀerentiating this expression and substituting into the partial diﬀerential equation





B2 − βB − 1, (A3)
A  = αAB, (A4)
subject to A(0) = 1 and B(0) = 0. These two ordinary diﬀerential equations are easily
solved by direct integration. The solutions to these are as given in Eq. (8). Now let
V (γ,T) denote the second expectation on the right-hand side of Eq. (A1). V (γ,T)
satisﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation
η2
2
Vγγ − γV − VT =0 , (A5)
subject to the boundary condition V (γ,0) = 1. Represent V (γ,T)a sC(T)exp(L(T)γ).
Diﬀerentiating this expression and substituting it into the partial diﬀerential equation
shows that this will be a solution provided that C(T)a n dL(T) satisfy the Riccati
equations,





27subject to the boundary conditions C(0) = 1 and L(0) = 0. These two ordinary
diﬀerential equations are easily solved by direct integration. Substituting the solutions
back into the deﬁnition for V (γ,T) implies that V (γ,T)=C(T)exp(−γT), where
C(T)i sa sd e ﬁn e di nE q .( 8 )( h e r eL(T)=−T).








rt + λt + γt dt
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Let W(λ,T) denote the expectation on the right hand side of (A8). Duﬃe, Pan, and
Singleton (2000) implies that W(λ,T)s a t i s ﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation,
σ2
2
λWλλ +( α − βλ)Wλ − λW − WT =0 , (A9)
subject to the boundary condition W(λ,0) = λ. Now represent W(λ,T)a se x p ( B(T)λ)
(G(T)+H(T)λ). Again, diﬀerentiating and substituting into the partial diﬀerential





B2 − βB − 1, (A10)
H  = H(α + σ2)B − Hβ, (A11)
G  = αBG+ αH, (A12)
subject to B(0) = G(0) = 0, and H(0) = 1. The equation for B  in (A10) is the
same as in (A3) and has the same solution. Eq. (A11) can now be solved for H(T)
by integration. Finally, with these expressions for B(T)a n dH(T), the function G(T)
can also be solved by a direct integration. The resulting solutions are as given in Eq.
(8) of the text.
Substituting these expressions for F(λ,T), V (γ,T), and W(λ,T)i n t oE q s . ( 4 )
and (7) gives the solutions for the value of the corporate bond shown in Eq. (8) and
the credit-default swap premium shown in Eq. (9).
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Credit-Default Swap Data.
The credit-default swap data for the study is taken from an extensive data set of premia
for ﬁve-year contracts provided by Citigroup that includes observations for the time
period from March 15, 2001 to October 9, 2002. (Enron is the sole exception in that its
credit-default swap data begins on December 5, 2000). Before September 26, 2001, the
data consist of Thursday quotations. After September 26, 2001, the data are recorded
on Wednesday. There is one period during the sample period where only a few ﬁrms
have credit-default swap premia quotations recorded. This is the period from December
5, 2001 to January 2, 2002.
Bond Yield Data.
In collecting bond yield data, the following criteria are applied.
• Only SEC-registered dollar-denominated issues are included.
• Medium term notes are avoided where possible.
• Only ﬁx e dc o u p o ni s s u e sa r eu s e d .
• Where possible, larger issues are chosen. Issues with total notional amount less
than $10 million are excluded. The issue sizes range from a low of $18 million to
ah i g ho f$ 6 . 5b i l l i o n ,w i t ham e a no f$ 7 3 5 million and a median of $500 million.
• Bonds with callable or puttable features are excluded. The only exceptions are
bonds with a make-whole provision. A make-whole provision stipulates that if the
issuer calls the bond, the amount paid for the call is based on a yield computed as
as p e c i ﬁc spread over Treasuries. Thus, the call price moves inversely with interest
rates, making refunding less likely (see Fabozzi (2001) pg. 11).
• At least two bonds need to be included in the bracketing set for a ﬁrm to be
included in the sample.
The algorithm for identifying candidate bonds for inclusion in the bracketing set is as
follows. We ﬁrst attempt to ﬁn dab o n dw i t ham a t u r i t ys h o r t e rt h a nﬁve years as
of the ﬁrst observation date for each ﬁrm. In most cases, this involves ﬁnding a bond
with a maturity date before March 15, 2006 which can then be used as the lower limit
of the bracketing interval. Maturity dates of bonds used for the lower limit range from
2003 to 2006. Similarly, we then attempt to ﬁnd a bond with a maturity longer than
ﬁve years as of the last observation date for each ﬁrm. This last observation date is
typically October 9, 2002. The maturity of this bond is then used as the upper limit of
the bracketing interval. Maturity dates for bonds used for the upper limit range from
2007 to 2011. Once the bonds deﬁning the lower and upper limits of the bracketing
interval are identiﬁed, bonds with intermediate maturity dates are identiﬁed to provide
roughly equally-spaced coverage of the entire bracketing interval. To be included in
the bracketing set, the candidate bonds identiﬁed in this manner also need to satisfy
29the criteria described above.
The yield data obtained from Citigroup have missing observations for some bonds on
some dates. The yield data are checked against yield data from Bloomberg and the
agreement is generally reasonable. For dates where the yields diverge signiﬁcantly, the
observation is deleted from the sample.
Some ﬁltering of the bond yield data is necessary. Most of the ﬁltering concerns yields
which change by large amounts on a given date compared to the yields of the other
bonds for the ﬁrm. In these cases, the yields for those bonds are removed from the
sample for that date. In other cases, part or all of the time series of yields for a
particular bond is removed from the sample. Typically, this is because part or all of the
time series of yields for the bond exhibits large movements that are clearly inconsistent
with the movements of other bonds for that ﬁrm. Three ﬁrms deserve special mention
in this regard. Qwest Capital, Sprint, and Worldcom were in severe ﬁnancial distress
during the latter part of our sample period. During this period, the yield data for these
companies exhibited what was clearly asynchronous updating. Week-to-week changes
in various yields often diﬀered by hundreds of basis points. Because of this, their yield
d a t ad u r i n gt h e s et i m ep e r i o d sa r en o ti n c l u d e di nt h es a m p l e .F o rQ w e s tC a p i t a l ,1 6
weekly data points remain after the data selection process, covering the period from
September 26, 2001 to January 30, 2002. For Sprint, 33 weekly data points remain
after the data selection process, covering the period from March 29, 2001 to February
6, 2002. For Worldcom, 33 weekly data points remain after the data selection process,
covering the period from March 15, 2001 to January 23, 2002. Worldcom ﬁled for
bankruptcy on July 21, 2002.
There are two mergers during the sample period. TRW was acquired by Northrup-
Grumman. The completion date of the merger was December 12, 2002, which is after
the end of the sample. Thus, only bonds with TRW as the issuer are used. Conoco
was acquired by Conoco-Phillips. The completion date for the merger was September
3, 2002, which is a few weeks before the end of the data set. Bonds with Conoco as
the issuer are used throughout the sample.
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Fig. 1. Time-Series Plot of Enron’s Credit-Default Swap Premium,
Yield Spread over Treasury, and Stock Price. The top plot shows the
time series of Enron’s credit-default swap premium and the yield spread over
































































Fig. 2. Time-Series Plot of Enron’s Intensity Process, Liquidity
Process, and the Diﬀerence Between the Default Component and
the Credit-Default Swap Premium. The top plot shows the intensity
process in basis points for each of the riskless curves. The middle plot shows
the liquidity process in basis points for each of the riskless curves. The
bottom plot shows the diﬀerence between the default component and the
credit-default swap premium in basis points, which is the bias caused by using
the credit-default swap premium as a measure of the default component of


































Fig. 3. Time-Series Plot of the Fraction of the Yield Spread Due
to Default for Enron. The three plots show the fraction of Enron’s yield











































Fig. 4. Distribution of Time-Series-Averaged Nondefault Compo-
nents. The three plots show the distribution across ﬁrms of the time-series
average of the nondefault component of the yield spread for the diﬀerent























































Fig. 5. Plot of Spread Components Versus Ending Rating. The
three plots show the default and nondefault components of the yield spread,
























Fig. 6. Time-Series Plot of the Average Nondefault Spread. The
plot shows the time series of the nondefault spread averaged over ﬁrms for
each of the riskless curves.